HISTORY OF THE 332ND FIGHTER GROUP - PART 2

In 1944, the Tuskeegee Airmen fought not only to survive their encounters with the Axis air forces, but to survive the racial malevolence of those on their side placed in authority over them.

Following the successful conclusion of the Sicilian campaign, Lt. Colonel William Momyer, commander of the 33rd Fighter Group that the 99th Fighter Squadron waspart of - who had not wanted the African-American-manned 99th in his unit and had done everything he could to belittle them and set them up for failure while they were - wrote a memorandum to General Hap Arnold, Chief of the USAAF, regarding what he claimed was the poor performance of the 99th squadron, which he specifically claimed in the memo was the result of the squadron being manned by Negroes who were unable to fulfill the role of pilots as could white men. He cited the poor record in air-to-air combat, difficulties with maintaining the squadron operationally, and command deficiences on the part of the squadron commander and senior flight leaders. He further claimed the squadron did not fight as a team, broke formation when attacked, chose to attack undefended targets instead of the briefed defended targets, avoided bad weather and, in general, performed poorly. He closed, stating: “It is my opinion that they are not of the fighting calibre of any squadron in this group. They have failed to display the aggressiveness and daring for combat that are necessary for a first class fighting organisation. It may be expected that we will get less work and less operational time out of the 99th FS than any squadron in this group.”

Momyer then carefully sent the memo up the chain of command in an effort to obtain as much written agreement by senior air force commanders as possible by the time it reached Arnold’s desk. Momyer’s immediate superior, Brigadier General Edwin House, Commander of XII Air Support Command agreed and took responsibility for the memo, which became known from that point as the “House Memorandum;” the report was sent up to and endorsed by Major General John Cannon, Deputy Commander of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force. He sent it on to Lt General Carl Spaatz, Deputy Commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, who added his opinion that the 99th be reassigned to coastal patrol duty in a location such as the Panama Canal Zone.

When the memo was leaked in Washington, “all hell broke loose” in the memory of Gladwin Hill, at the time the Associated Press’ “Man With the Eighth” who was home on leave, recalled. Major Benjamin O. Davis, commander of the 99th squadron, was called to testify before a Congressional committee evaluating the 99th’s performance and the viability of the Tuskeegee Program.

Like all congressional committees in the Democratic-majority Congress at that time, this committee was chaired by a Southern White Democrat and included several others as senior members; their power in congress came from seniority created by the one-party “Solid South;” their power was based on “Jim Crow” white supremacy and exclusion of African Americans from political and social involvement in what was later called “American Apartheid,” which was cited by the Nazis when they came to power as the model for excluding Jews and other unwanted groups in Germany. It was also significant that the majority of the senior officer corps of the American military at this time were Southern in background and equally committed to the policy of “Jim Crow.” The press supported that view without question. After the memorandum was leaked in Washington, a “Time” magazine cover story was titled “Experiment Proved?” Its thesis was that the 99th might be disbanded on the strength of the House Memorandum.

Davis departed Pantelleria to return to Washington on 2 September 1943. He later explained, “I was absolutely enraged. I was sure that all the aces were held by the Army Air Force, especially with the correspondence going up through channels the way it did, and the statement by General House that a Negro didn’t possess the physical qualifications that would make him a good fighter pilot.”

In Washington, Davis testified before Congress in early January 1944. Accustomed to remaining publicly composed in the face of overt racism, he reacted strongly to the biased questions of the congressional interrogators, and stated with some passion that the pilots and crewmen of the 99th squadron were “no different from any other Americans at war in other USAAF squadrons,” and that their performance was the equal of other units manned by white personnel. He later said, “I recall saying something to the effect that overseas, the reception given to black people on the ground was much more pleasant and more favorable than the reception given to black people on the ground here in the United States. I also stressed the determination of the members of the 99th to demonstrate their abilities and set the stage for the oncoming combat units that were still training in the states.”

He further explained the 99th had only received 26 pilots since being formed, as compared to 30-35 pilots assigned to the other fighter squadrons in the same period, pointing out that this shortage meant his pilots flew up to six sorties per day, more than the sortie rate for white pilots, and contributing to operational exhaustion of his fliers. He detailed the fact that the ground attack missions assigned to the 99th squadron meant the pilots were less likely to encounter enemy aircraft, accounting for the low air-to-air score.

After hearing Davis’ testimony, General Arnold stated publicly that he would take

no action until an official study was completed comparing the performance of the 99th Fighter Squadron with that of other P-40 units in the Twelfth Air Force, to establish whether the criticism in the House Memorandum was accurate. Arnold himself was still not convinced that black aviators could perform well in combat, and privately advocated their relocation to a rear defense area as suggested by his long-time friend and comrade, Spaatz.

Fortunately, editing the subsequent report became the duty of Colonel Emmett M. “Rosie” O’Donnell, chief of Arnold’s Advisory Council and even then a “legend” in the USAAF. Most importantly, O’Donnell was not a Southerner. Born in Brooklyn, New York in 1906, he had joined the Air Corps in 1930 following graduation from West Point in 1928. In 1941, he pioneered the dangerous flights through Japanese-controlled airspace in the Central Pacific to bring the B-17s of t he 14th Bomb Squadron from Hawaii to the Philippines before Pearl Harbor, where he established an outstanding combat record in the battles to defend the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies following the outbreak of war on 7 December 1941, serving as operations officer of the Far East Air Force. He earned the DFC on 10 December 1941 for attacking a Japanese heavy cruiser and its escorting destroyer in one of the surviving B-17s.

Bucking the opinions of superior officers, when O’Donnell finished editing the report, he included a cover memo, in which he “urgently recommended that this entire subject be

reconsidered,” pointing out the absurdity of racial discrimination in wartime, and observing that one to four squadrons were “but a drop in the overall war effort.” He concluded, “I feel that submitting such a proposal (to disband the 99th) to the President at this time would definitely not be appreciated by him. He would probably interpret it as indicating a serious lack of understanding of the broad problems facing the country.”

The edited report was released on 30 March 1944. It concluded that the 99th Fighter Squadron had performed as well as the white P-40 squadrons with which it flew in combat. President Franklin Roosevelt never saw the report. Davis said of the events, “If that G-3 evaluation had not been made, God knows what would have happened.” The 99th was allowed to stay in combat.

According to Davis, the report had a secondary effect. “It eventually sent us to the Fifteenth Air Force, and took us out of the nasty, dirty close air support business, and put us into a sort of glamour business – escorting bombers. Sometimes things turn out for the best, and that’s exactly what happened.”

Following his successful defense of the 99th squadron’s combat record, Davis was promoted to Lt. Colonel and assigned as commanding officer of the newly-formed 332nd group, composed of the 100th, 301st and 302nd fighter squadrons, manned by graduates of the Tuskeegee Program.

Next: Proof In combat

The story of the 332nd Fighter Group - “the Red Tails” - is my contribution to Black History Month, an event the federal government no longer recognizes. This history cannot be allowed to end up forgotten. This is adapted from my coming book, “Against All Enemies: The Forgotten Fifteenth Fighter Command In World War II,” which will be published in the spring of 2026.

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