THE WORLD WEIGHS THE OPTIONS IN GAZA

The threat Iran poses to Israel is obvious: heavily armed militants supported militarily and financially by Iran - Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad - share the Iranian government’s commitment to destroy Israel as a Jewish state; they now wouldn’t exist without Iran’s support to maintain their domestic political power and military strength. Regarding the larger military and nuclear threat posed by Iran, Israel had conducted assassinations and sabotage attacks inside Iran aimed at slowing its nuclear, drone, and missile programs; additionally, airstrikes are regularly flown against Iranian military sites and arms shipments inside Syria.

The Israeli ability to cross Iranian borders to assassinate military leaders and scientists, and to bomb heavily defended production and operational facilities has resulted in the shadow war that has gone on over the past decade-plus appear to be a one-sided fight. To date, Israel has damaged Iran more, while Iran’s attempted retaliation - most obviously the failed plots to kill high-level Israelis abroad - have been unsuccesful. Til now, Iran has not possessed the ability to strike a meaningful blow inside Israel.

That changed on October 7.

The Hamas terror attack was the fruit of Iran’s years-long effort to strengthen Islamic militant groups and destroy Israelis’ sense of security.

Hamas is only one piece of this broader strategy. Even if Israel succeeds in destroying or permanently weakening Hamas, the Iranian threat would not be ended. Thus, it is likely that the Gaza war is the beginning of a larger, longer lasting, and much more complicated confrontation.

This doesn’t necessarily mean there will be an open regional war - though there are other actors with other interests that could lead to that - but it is likely that Israel is likely to turn its attention to Iran more directly.

So far, Iran’s strategy against Israel has been to maintain a low level of more or less continuous violence or the threat of such - to inflict a thousand cuts rather than employ direct military force.

However, October 7 and its aftermath have forced Israel’s hand, since it is now clear that the indirect approach to Iran has been ineffective. Thus, Israel will sooner or later change the game; what that could involve and how long it could last is anyone’s guess.

What is assured is that things can get worse. The risk of escalation is very real, and the prospect of a wider regional war is uncomfortably close.

There is a huge fear in U.S. military and defense policy circles today that the Israel-Hamas war will skid out of control into a regional war that will bring Iran and the U.S. into a direct confrontation.

Last Thursday, a U.S. Navy warship in the northern Red Sea shot down three cruise missiles and several drones; these were apparently launched by the pro-Iranian Houthi militia in Yemen, and were headed toward Israel. More missile and drone attacks, likely from pro-Iranian militias, were made against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria.

This weekend, the Department of Defense announced that the USS Eisenhower battle group will move from the eastern Mediterranean - where it reinforced the USS Ford battle group last week - to the Persian Gulf. This is a direct move to try and deter Iran from open military action.

Fears that the Gaza war could become a wider and more devastating Middle East war have grown over recent days as clashes with Iranian-backed Hezbollah intensify along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, while Israel presses ahead with its plans for a ground incursion into Gaza.

During the week following the terror attack on October 7, it appeared that Iran and Hassan Nasrallah - the Hezbollah militia leader in Lebanon - were keeping very tight control of their forces on the northern Israel border and in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The second week has seen increasing signs these forces are attacking Israeli targets more aggressively, and that American units in the region might become targets if the United States intervenes should the conflict with Israel become more open. Iran sees how an Israeli invasion of Gaza could promote their goal of driving the U.S. out of Middle East.

There have been so many rockets fired by Hezbollah militia in South Lebanon that events are one degree away from a full-scale missile war between Israel and Hezbollah, and very possibly directly between Israel and Iran.

If the Hezbollah proxies continue to hit Israel, there is an almost-inevitable likelihood that Israel will fire a missile directly at Tehran. Israeli missile-armed submarines are probably in the Persian Gulf as this is written. If that happens, all bets are off.

The United States, Russia and China could all be drawn in directly or indirectly. A battle group of the Chinese Navy will soon arrive in the Persian Gulf to participate in “exercises.”

The destruction last Tuesday of the Gaza hospital triggered angry denunciations and calls for vengeance across the region. Demonstrators took to the streets in the West Bank, marched to the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, and converged on Israeli diplomatic missions in Turkey and Jordan, blaming the strike on Israel. Despite the now-solid proof that the event was the result of a misfired missile by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, this attitude in the Arab states has not changed.

The hospital event has continued to reverberate. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan tweeted that “hitting a hospital containing women, children and innocent civilians is the latest example of Israel’s attacks devoid of the most basic human values,” while Saudi Arabia called it a “heinous crime committed by the Israeli occupation forces.”

This widespread Arab reaction may spell the end to the warming diplomatic ties for Israel across the region.

King Abdullah of Jordan, who is a more reliable, long-term US ally than any other Middle Eastern leader (including Netanyahu) spoke directly at the weekend conference in Cairo in English to make sure there was no mistranslation when he called what Israel has done in Gaza since October 7 “a war crime.”

Before that event, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian warned hat Iran’s militia allies in the “resistance front” - Gaza and southern Lebanon - could take what he called “preemptive action” to deter an Israeli ground offensive. Demonstrators chanted in Beirut, “We have to retaliate from Lebanon.”

But Iran faces a dilemma that could determine whether there is a multi-front war.

Over the past ten years, a formidable array of militias and proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen - in addition to Hamas - has been created by Iran, which has to calculate now whether it can afford to expend the military leverage these allies provide in a potentially ruinous conflict to defending one - Hamas.

With two aircraft carrier battle groups in the region to deter Hezbollah and iran itself, the U.S. could be drawn into any fight if Hezbollah launches a full-scale assault on Israel. Ir Iran could launch drones from Yemen to strike Israel, there is the possibility Hezbollah possesses similar weapons, which would put the Ford battle group in the eastern Mediterranean in the target sights. There have already been exchanges of fire along the Syrian border, and there are reports Iran- allied fighters have moved to southern Syria from eastern Lebanon.

Iranian-backed groups in Iraq have warned they will attack Americans in the country if the United States gets involved, and the Houthis in Yemen have also made threats.

Jon Alterman, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said in a recent interview, “If this starts going bad, it could go bad in a lot of places simultaneously and very quickly. We are absolutely heading into a big unknown.”

The biggest concern, however, is the well-armed, battle-trained and highly disciplined Hezbollah force in Lebanon, which has an estimated 130,000 - 150,000 rockets and missiles aimed at Israel.

Firas Maksad, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Middle East Institute said in a weekend interview that a full-scale war with Lebanon would turn Gaza “into a sideshow.” “What Hezbollah has in military hardware and capability dwarfs Hamas in Gaza.”

Today, Netanyahu warned Lebanon that “the price you will pay will be far heavier” than in any previous war if Hexbollah makes a move.

While Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Middle East capitals last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian visited Tehran’s allies in Syria, Lebanon and Qatar.

Fortunately, it appears the Iranians do not want escalation and are keen to find ways to avoid one, according to a regional diplomat familiar with that Iranian allies who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. While making it clear they are prepared to fight, Iran and Hezbollah have not set public red lines for what events in Gaza would trigger their involvement.

Iran’s intentions can’t be independently confirmed, but if its caution is real. A senior Hamas official, speaking from Beirut, insisted Iran was not involved in the October 7 assault.According to Ali Barakah, head of Hamas’ international relations department, the October 7 attack was intended as a “limited operation” to trade Israeli hostages for Hamas prisoners, saying that “The failure of the Israeli army surprised us, and this is how it got so big.”

The real moment of choice for Iran will come if Hamas were on the brink of annihilation, putting Iran’s entire “ring of fire” regional strategy on the line. Iran cannot be seen as abandoning its allies if it is to maintain its relationship with these forces.

Built up over decades since the creation of Hezbollah in 1982, the strategy aims to position enough militia firepower on Israel’s borders to deter an Israeli attack on Iran, a long-standing fear that has grown in recent years as Iran has accelerated its nuclear program. The Palestinian cause is central to the strategy and to Iran’s identity as a revolutionary Islamic state.

It is incumbent on President Biden to use the skills he has demonstrated so well to turn away from this potential disaster.

For the West - and most particularly the United States - equating Netanyahu and Israel is a problem. He has been disastrous for Israel. He has been accused multiple times of corruption, has elevated racist ultra-nationalists to the highest ranks of the Israeli government, and has worked to weaken Israeli democracy and consolidate power within his office, while allowing the expansion of settlements and done nothing but exacerbate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He connived to solidify Hamas’ standing in Gaza as a means to undercut the Palestinian Authority so he could avoid serious negotiations to reach a permanent resolution.

The Wall Street Journal - certainly no left wing media - pointed out: “Netanyahu pursued a divide-and-conquer strategy by propping up Hamas, while at the same time weakening the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.”

The Biden administration cannot defer to Netanyahu. We underwrite the country with $3.9 billion a year; that translates into leverage, which ought to be used it to prevent further miscalculation by a man who cannot be trusted—especially not to lead a military action with possible consequences for the entire planet.

President Biden’s trip to the Middle East - even with the cancellation of meetings with Arab leaders in the aftermath of the hospital explosion - was a key demonstration that the U.S. does not want this war to expand, either by the introduction of the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia or by Israeli overreaction in the Palestinian territories.

The visit also put Netanyahu on notice that the U.S. is watching him. Netanyahu allied himself with Trump and since Biden became president has appeared to consider his relationships with U.S. right-wing figures more important than his relationship with Biden. Now, with his position on shaky ground as Israelis blame him for failing to protect them, Netanyahu jumped at the chance to be seen with Biden. One hopes that while there is public support for Israel, there are private messages telling the Israelis to think twice before acting once. The fact that the Israeli defense minister cited U.S. financial support for Israel as reason for delaying action in Gaza in an interview this weekend demonstrates that the Israelis are aware that they have to listen to the U.S. at this point.

This means that the United States is in the driver’s seat, if we are willing to use the advantage we hold. The stakes are enormous.

If Israel moves into Gaza now to destroy Hamas without expressing a clear commitment to seek a two-state solution with the Palestinian Authority and an end to planting Jewish settlements deep in the West Bank, it could trigger a global conflagration and explode the entire pro-American alliance structure that the United States has built in the region since the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Since October 7, Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition partners have been eager to fan the flames in the West Bank. Settlers there have killed at least seven Palestinian civilians in acts of revenge in just the past week. Netanyahu should not allow this, but he needs those extremists to keep himself out of jail.

The way to de-escalate this “march to folly” is for Biden to tell Netanyahu clearly that taking over Gaza without pairing it with a totally new approach to settlements, the West Bank and a two-state solution would be a disaster for Israel and a disaster for America.

Otherwise, October 7 has the potential to trigger a Middle East war with every great power and regional power involved, which would make it very difficult to stop once started.

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