THE SECOND BATTLE OF KURSK

Ukrainian armor around Kursk, August 9, 2024

In the summer of 1943, the Battle of Kursk doomed the German Army on the Eastern Front. Loosing the greatest, largest tank battle in history meant the Wehrmacht would never again mount an offensive.

The new Battle of Kursk, 81 years later in 2024, may prove a death knell for Putin’s army. Russian losses are reported severe.

This is from LCOL Alexander Vindman’s Substack:

On August 6th 2024, the Ukrainian military launched an offensive aimed at Kursk Oblast in southwestern Russia. The speed and pace of Ukraine’s ongoing operation in Kursk represents a major departure from the months of grinding, high-attrition fighting seen along the relatively static line of contact in Eastern Ukraine. An initial report from the Institute for the Study of War published August 7th estimated that Ukraine has advanced at least 10km into Russian territory and entered the city of Sudzha. A following report published on August 8th claims that Ukrainian forces have continued to push eastward and have effectively established control over Sudzha. As of August 9th, Ukrainian forces are believed to currently occupy 350 square kilometers of Russian territory - meaning that in three days Ukraine has advanced further into Russian territory than the Russian army has advanced in Eastern Ukraine over the past seven months.

Although there have been several cross-border raids into Russian territory by Ukrainian forces over the past two years, the ongoing Kursk Offensive represents a different scale of military operation altogether. Rather than drawing upon semi-independent paramilitary groups like the Freedom of Russia Legion and Russian Volunteer Corps, this advance has incorporated Battalion-sized formations of professional Ukrainian troops. This has reportedly included elements of the Ukrainian 82nd Air Assault Brigade and the 22nd and 88th Mechanized Brigades. While the aforementioned Freedom of Russia Legion and Russian Volunteer Corps were able to enter Russian territory and engage elements of the Russian border guards service and Rosgvardia, these volunteer groups ultimately lacked the firepower and logistic capabilities to either maintain control of captured Russian territory or advance further. In comparison, the Ukrainian forces currently fighting in Kursk have all the logistic and material support needed for a proper sustained engagement against Russian forces. Usage of sophisticated equipment like the HIMARS and German-produced Mardar armored vehicles in the ongoing Kursk offensive is a major departure from previous raids in Belgorod which were largely limited to lightly armored vehicles and small arms. Recent activity suggests that Ukrainian forces have captured several strategic objectives near Sudzha such as a 330 kV substation, sections of the Lgov-Belgorod rail line, and a natural gas measuring station within Gazprom’s pipeline network.

While it is too early to judge the overall effectiveness of this operation, the Kursk Offensive may have a major impact on the line of contact in Eastern Ukraine. This operation may throw the Russian military off-kilter for the foreseeable future as Moscow will need to address the ongoing advance of the Ukrainian military. This means that Moscow may need to divert material and manpower to Kursk that would have otherwise been sent to Donetsk. Given that these reserve units would be engaging elite elements of the Ukrainian military, there is a high likelihood that this operation leads to serious losses among Russian forces. Additionally, the panicked reaction of local residents of Kursk and reported rout of Chechen “Akhmat” units suggest that this operation has met minimal resistance within Russia’s borderlands. Depending on the overall outcome, the Kursk Offensive may be seen as a display of Ukraine’s offensive capabilities after months of defensive footing and serve as a major morale boost. The ability of the Ukrainian military to achieve success in even small-scale operations in Russian territory will serve as a hint of the potential effectiveness of a fully equipped military force trained to western standards. Additionally, the occupation of Russian territory gives Ukraine a hedge against maximalist demands from Moscow by allowing Kyiv to trade land for Russian concessions in any future peace process.

While it’s too early to judge the overall effectiveness of this operation, we should consider what a victory in Kursk looks like. If the Ukrainian military is able to use this offensive to sow chaos within the Russian borderland, inflict heavy losses against enemy forces, draw troops and materials away from Donbas, and maintain its current hold on captured territory, then the operation may be considered a success.

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Also of note, the ex-NATO F-16 fighters have begun arriving in Ukraine with trained Ukrainian pilots. Iftheir bsases can be defended from Russian missile strikes, they may change the air war by shooting down the missile launching aircraft over Russia.

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