THE FORGOTTEN BOMB - PART 4

Still, it was not the bomb that forced the hand of the militarists.

At 2300 hours Trans-Baikal time the night before, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov called Japanese ambassador Naotake Sato to his offices, where he informed the ambassador that the Soviet Union had declared war on the Empire of Japan, that from one minute past midnight, Trans-Baikal time on August 9, the Soviet government would consider itself to be at war with Japan. At exactly that time, the Red Army, led by Marshal of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Vasilevsky, commenced its invasion of the Japanese puppet state of Manchuoko, exactly 90 days after the surrender of Germany, exactly as Stalin had promised at Yalta. The news of the attack was flashed to Tokyo at 0400 hours, Tokyo time.

The Soviets offensive commenced simultaneously on three fronts to the east, west and north of Manchuria. Japanese forces, weakened by the transfer of units to Kyushu to oppose the expected American invasion, fell back at all points. By 14 August, the Red Army’s spearhead, had captured objectives 700 miles inside Manchuria. Units were advancing so fast they were outrunning their supply lines. The 100,000-strong 16th Army invaded the southern half of Sakhalin Island at the same time as the advance into Manchuria began, with orders to mop up Japanese resistance and prepare to invade Hokkaido, northernmost of Japan’s home islands, no later than 24 August.

With the defeat at Okinawa in June, Emperor Hirohito had lost all confidence in the chances that Japan might achieve a military victory. The Emperor later wrote that, “I was told that the iron from bomb fragments dropped by the enemy was being used to make shovels. This confirmed my opinion that we were no longer in a position to continue the war.”

There seemed little chance that there was any event that would lead to American acceptance of the Japanese peace proposals that had been put forward by his confidante, Marquis Koichi Kido, in the "Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation," which had been presented on 9 June. Kido’s plan warned that by the end of 1945 Japanese ability to conduct modern war would be destroyed and that it was unlikely the government could control civil unrest. "... We cannot be sure we will not share the fate of Germany and be reduced to adverse circumstances under which we will not attain even our supreme object of safeguarding the Imperial Household and preserving the national polity."

Hirohito authorized Kido to approach the members of the Supreme Council for the Conduct of the War - the "Big Six." Foreign Minister Togo was very supportive. Prime Minister Suzuki and Navy Minister Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai were both cautiously supportive, each wondering what the other thought. Army Minister General Korechika Anami insisted that diplomacy must wait until "after the United States has sustained heavy losses" in Operation Ketsugo, the defense of Kyushu against invasion.

Officially, the position of the military leaders was summed up in the War Journal of the Imperial Headquarters, which concluded: “We can no longer direct the war with any hope of success. The only course left is for Japan’s one hundred million people to sacrifice their lives by charging the enemy to make them lose the will to fight.”

When Ambassador Sato presented the Kido proposal to the Soviets, it was made clear to him the terms were unacceptable. While the Soviets had reassured Japan in April when they gave the required one-year notice of non-renewal of the Nonaggression Pact that there would be no change in status during that year, Foreign Minister Togo now took the Soviet response to mean that Stalin had made an agreement with the Western Allies to join the Pacific War at some date in the near future. Suzuki, Yonai and Anami argued against this position.

On 26 July 1945, the Potsdam Declaration was issued, calling for unconditional surrender: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." It ended with the warning, "We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay."

For the Japanese, the fact that the Declaration made no mention of the Emperor at all left unclear what Allied intentions were on the issue of utmost importance to the Japanese. Would the Emperor be regarded as one of those who had "misled the people of Japan" or even a war criminal? Might the Emperor become part of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government"? The answers to these questions were crucial to any Japanese response.

On the afternoon of 9 August, it was clear to anyone in the upper reaches of the Japanese government that the policy of “prompt and utter destruction” had been implemented by the Allies. Japanese physicists involved in the Japanese atom bomb project had visited Hiroshima and reported that the destruction there was indeed the result of an atomic explosion. The initial response, as stated by Admiral Toyoda on receipt of this report, had been that the Americans could not have created more than one bomb. The bombing of Nagasaki demonstrated that Hiroshima was not a one-time event, and that further atomic attacks must be expected. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria posed the threat of an invasion from the north against nonexistent defenses, since all Japanese forces were massed to oppose the expected American invasion in the south. Any Soviet occupation of Japan carried with it the definite knowledge that it would mean the absolute end of the imperial system. The Japanese government was aware what had already happened in Germany since the end of the war there.

The news of the bombing of Nagasaki and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria had immediate profound effects on Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign Minister Togo, who now both agreed that the war must be ended. The two were opposed by Minister of War Anami and the senior leadership of the Japanese Army, which underestimated the scale of the Soviet attack.

At the time the Supreme Council met at 1030 hours on 9 August, there was only the fact of the Soviet invasion. Prime Minister Suzuki - who had just come from a meeting with the Emperor and understood his position on further hostilities, stated that it was impossible to continue the war. Foreign Minister Togo gave his opinion that the terms of the Potsdam Declaration should be accepted if the Allies would guarantee the Emperor’s position. Navy Minister Yonai’s position was that a diplomatic proposal must be made since the government could no longer afford to wait for better circumstances. Army Minister Anami announced the Army was prepared to impose martial law to stop any attempt to make peace.

At about ten minutes past eleven that morning, it was announced that Nagasaki had been hit by a second atomic bomb. By the time the meeting ended, the Big Six had split on the issue of seeking peace 3–3. Prime Minister Suzuki, Foreign Minister Togo, and Navy Minister Admiral Yonai favored Togo’s one additional condition to Potsdam, while Army Minister General Anami, Army Chief of Staff General Umezu, and Combined Fleet Commander Admiral Toyoda insisted that three further terms that modified Potsdam be added to the Japanese peace proposal: that the Japanese government handle their own disarmament; that the Japanese government deal with any Japanese war criminals; and that there be no occupation of Japan.

While the crew of “Bockscar” prayed they had enough gas left in the tanks to make it to Okinawa rather than crash land in the open ocean, and while they later flew on back to Tinian, momentous events were taking place in Tokyo.

At 1430 hours, the full cabinet met. The only topic was surrender. As with the Big Six, the cabinet split evenly with neither Togo’s proposal not that of Anami achieving a majority.

During the debate, Anami informed the meeting that, a captured P-51 pilot had revealed to his interrogators under torture that the Americans had 100 atom bombs ready, and that Tokyo and Kyoto would be targeted "in the next few days".

First Lieutenant Marcus McDilda, a pilot in the 46th Fighter Squadron of the 21st Fighter Group based on Iwo Jima, had bailed out of his P-51D, named "The Gator," after being hit by flak while attacking coastal shipping. In truth, he knew as much about the Manhattan Project and the atomic bomb as every other American in the Pacific - that two days earlier one had apparently been dropped on Hiroshima, as President Truman had announced. In an attempt to stop the excruciating torture he was undergoing, he lied to his interrogators and gave them the number of atomic weapons as 100, since it appeared that was what they wanted to hear. With the lie accepted, he was immediately classified a high-profile prisoner, which probably saved him from a planned beheading.

The truth was that there were three bomb shells on Tinian, awaiting delivery of their nuclear cores. The first of these would be ready for use by 19 August, and would likely have been used against Tokyo. A second shell would be operational by September. It was hoped as many as three more might be ready if needed by D-Day of Operation Olympic in November.

The rest of the cabinet believed what Anami reported. It was still not enough to change minds and the meeting adjourned at 1730 hours after failing to find a consensus. A second meeting was called at 1800 hours that lasted four hours, and also ended without consensus.

At 2300 hours, Suzuki and Togo met with Hirohito, who accepted Suzuki’s proposal for an impromptu Imperial conference. The cabinet again gathered, this time in the presence of the Emperor, just before midnight. At this time, Suzuki presented General Anami’s four conditions for peace as the consensus position of the Supreme War Council. After other members of the Supreme Council spoke, Privy Councilor Kiichiro Hiranuma, president of the Privy Council, outlined the nation’s total inability to defend itself and listed the domestic problems, starting with the national shortage of food. There was more debate to no avail.

At approximately 0200 hours on 10 August, Prime Minister Suzuki finally turned to the Emperor and asked him to decide between the two positions. Togo later recalled that Hirohito stated:

“I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer.

“There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, shows that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders?”

“It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable.

“I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.”

The Emperor then left the conference and Suzuki pushed for acceptance of the Emperor's will, which was given.

Within a matter of hours, the Foreign Ministry contacted the Allies through the Swiss government and announced Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, but would not accept any conditions that would "prejudice the prerogatives" of the Emperor. American Secretary of State James F. Byrnes wrote the Allied response, which was approved by the British, Chinese, and Soviet governments, on 12 August. On the status of the Emperor it said:

“From the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.”

The logjam had broken.

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