ISRAEL'S OTHER ATTACK ON AMERICANS.

The World Central Kitchen attack wasn't the first.

The Israelis have claimed in the aftermath that their targeted assault on the World Central Kitchen aid convoy in Gaza was a “mistake.” This morning they released the finding of an official investigation into the strike, which called the strike “a grave mistake stemming from a serious failure due to a mistaken identification, errors in decision-making, and an attack contrary to the Standard Operating Procedures.” Two officers have been dismissed from the Israeli military. And Israel has agreed to permit the opening of a third crossing into Gaza for humanitarian aid.

If you believe that bullshit, you probably still believe in the Tooth Fairy, the Easter Bunny and Santa Claus.

This isn’t the first time the Israelis have fucked with us during one of their wars.

During the Six Day War in 1967, their air force and navy deliberately attacked and nearly sank the USS “Liberty,” later claiming it was the result of a “mistaken identification.”

Here’s the background to that event:

USS Liberty in 1967

USS Liberty (AGTR-5) was a Belmont-class technical research ship (i.e. an electronic spying ship). She was originally built and served in World War II as a VC2-S-AP3 type Victory cargo ship named SS Simmons Victory.

In February 1963, the U.S. Navy acquired Simmons Victory. On June 8, 1963, she was renamed USS Liberty. On April 1, 1964, she was classified a Technical Research Ship (AGTR-5), and commissioned in December 1964. In February 1965, Liberty steamed to the Norfolk Naval Base in Virginia, where she was further outfitted at a cost of 20 million for the mission of supporting the National Security Agency by collecting and processing foreign communications and other electronic emissions of possible national defense interests. In June, 1965, Liberty began her first deployment off the west coast of Africa. She carried out several more operations during the next two years, and went to the Mediterranean Sea in 1967. During the Six-Day War, she was sent to collect electronic intelligence in the eastern Mediterranean.

On the afternoon of June 8, 1967, while in international waters off the northern coast of the Sinai Peninsula, Liberty was attacked and damaged by aircraft of the Israeli Air Force and motor torpedo boats of the Israeli Navy. The combined air and sea attack killed 34 crew members (officers, seamen, two marines, and one civilian NSA employee), wounded 171, and severely damaged the ship. Liberty was severely damaged, with a 39-by-24-foot hole amidships; her crew kept her afloat, and she was able to leave the area under her own power.

At the time, USS Liberty was in international waters north of the Sinai Peninsula, about 25.5 nautical miles northwest from the Egyptian city of El Arish.

Israel later apologized for the attack, stating Liberty had been mistaken for an Egyptian ship. In May 1968, the Israeli government paid $3.32 million (equivalent to US$29.1 million in 2023) to the U.S. government in compensation for the families of the 34 men killed in the attack. In March 1969, Israel paid a further $3.57 million ($29.6 million in 2023) to the men who had been wounded. In December 1980, Israel agreed to pay $6 million ($22.2 million in 2023) as the final settlement for material damage to the ship plus 13 years of interest.

The facts of the attack are at odds with the Israeli claim of a “mistaken identification.”

According to Israeli sources, at the start of the war on 5 June, General Yitzhak Rabin, IDF Chief of Staff, informed Commander Ernest Carl Castle, the American naval attaché in Tel Aviv, that Israel would defend its coast with every means at its disposal, including sinking unidentified ships. He asked the U.S. to keep its ships away from Israel's shore or at least inform Israel of their exact positions.

American sources said that no inquiry about ships in the area was made until after the attack on Liberty. In a message sent from U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk to U.S. Ambassador Walworth Barbour in Tel Aviv, Rusk asked for "urgent confirmation" of Israel's statement. Barbour responded: "No request for info on U.S. ships operating off Sinai was made until after Liberty incident." Further, Barbour stated: "Had Israelis made such an inquiry it would have been forwarded immediately to the chief of naval operations and other high naval commands and repeated to Department of State.”

With the outbreak of war, Liberty’s CO, Captain William L. McGonagle, immediately asked Vice Admiral William I. Martin at U.S. Sixth Fleet headquarters to send a destroyer for escort and as an auxiliary communications center. The following day, Admiral Martin replied: "Liberty is a clearly marked United States ship in international waters, not a participant in the conflict and not a reasonable subject for attack by any nation. Request denied."He promised that in the unlikely event of an inadvertent attack, jet fighters from Sixth Fleet would be overhead in ten minutes.

On the night of June 7 (Washington time), early morning on June 8 in the Mediterranean, 0310 hours local time, the Pentagon ordered Sixth Fleet headquarters to tell Liberty to come no closer than 100 nautical miles to Israel, Syria, or the Sinai coast. According to the Naval Court of Inquiry and the NSA official history, the order to withdraw was not sent on the radio frequency Liberty monitored for her orders until 1525 Zulu, several hours after the attack; this was due to a long series of administrative and message routing problems. The Navy said a large volume of unrelated high-precedence traffic, including intelligence intercepts related to the conflict, were being handled at the time; and that this combined with a shortage of qualified radiomen contributed to the delayed transmission of the withdrawal message.

Official testimony combined with Liberty's deck log establish that throughout the morning of the attack, the ship was overflown at various times and locations by Israeli aircraft.

At about 0545 hours Sinai time, a ship-sighting report was received at Israeli Central Coastal Command. Liberty was identified by an aerial naval observer as "apparently a destroyer, sailing 70 miles west of Gaza". Her location was marked on a CCC control table, using a red marker, indicating an unidentified vessel. At about 0600 hours, aerial naval observer, Major Uri Meretz, reported that the ship appeared to be a U.S. Navy supply ship; at about 0900 hours the red marker was replaced with a green marker to indicate a neutral vessel. About the same time, an Israeli fighter pilot reported that a ship 20 miles north of El Arish had fired at his aircraft after he tried to identify the vessel. Israeli naval command dispatched two destroyers to investigate, but they were returned to their previous positions at 0940 hours, after doubts emerged during the pilot's debriefing. After the Noratlas landed and the naval observer was debriefed, the ship was further identified as USS Liberty, based on its "GTR-5" hull markings. Liberty's marker was removed from CCC's Control Table at 1100 hours, due to its positional information being considered out of date.

So the Israelis knew Liberty was there and had identified her accurately.

At 1124 hours, a report was received that El Arish was being shelled from the sea. Additionally, at 1127 hours, the Israeli Supreme Command received a report stating that a ship had been shelling Arish, but the shells had fallen short. (Liberty had four .50 caliber machine guns mounted on her decks and thus could not have shelled the coast.) The Head of Operations ordered the report be verified. At 1145 hours, another report arrived two ships were approaching the El Arish coast.

At 1205 hourstorpedo boat Division 914, commanded by Commander Moshe Oren, received orders to patrol a position 20 miles north of El Arish. Commander Oren was told Israeli aircraft would be dispatched to the area after the target had been detected. Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin was concerned the supposed Egyptian shelling was a prelude to an amphibious landing that could outflank Israeli forces. Rabin reiterated the standing order to sink any unidentified ships in the area, but advised caution, as Soviet vessels were reportedly operating nearby.

At 1341 hours, the torpedo boats detected an unknown vessel 20 miles northwest of El Arish. The ship's speed was estimated at 30 knots. The speed was significant because it indicated the target was a combat vessel. Israeli forces had standing orders to fire on any unknown vessels moving in the area at over 20 knots. The Chief of Naval Operations asked the torpedo boats to double-check their calculations. A few minutes later, Commander Oren reported that the target was moving at a speed of 28 knots

Liberty's top speed was far below 28 knots. At the time of the attack Liberty was following her signal-intercept mission course along the northern Sinai coast, at about 5 knots.

The data on the ship gave the impression it was an Egyptian destroyer fleeing toward port after shelling Dl Arish. Commander Oren requested the Israeli Air Force dispatch aircraft to intercept. At 1348 hours, the Chief of Naval Operations requested fighter aircraft be sent to the ship's location.

The IAF dispatched Kursa Flight - two Mirage III fighter jets - arrived over Liberty at about 1400 hours. Captain Iftach Spector radioed to one of the torpedo boats his observation that the ship looked like a military ship with one smokestack and one mast. He also said the ship appeared to him like a destroyer. In a post-attack statement, the pilots said they saw no distinguishable markings or flag on the ship. That a C-3 cargo ship could be mistaken for a Hunt-class destroyer continues the long tradition in all non-naval air forces that pilots cannot accurately identify ships, ever.

An Egyptian “Hunt” class destroyer

At this point, a recorded exchange took place between a command headquarters weapons systems officer, one of the air controllers, and the chief air controller, questioning a possible American presence. Immediately after the exchange, at 1457 hours, the chief air controller, Lieutenant-Colonel Shmuel Kislev, cleared the Mirages to attack.

The Mirages dove on the ship and attacked with 30-mm cannons and rockets. The attack came a few minutes after the crew completed a chemical attack drill, with Captain McGonagle on the command bridge. The crew was in "stand-down mode", with their helmets and life jackets removed. Eight crewmen either were killed immediately or received fatal injuries and died later, and 75 were wounded, includiong Captain McGonagle, who was hit in the right thigh and arm. Antennas were severed, gas drums caught fire, and the ship's flag was knocked down. McGonagle sent an urgent request for help to Fleet, "Under attack by unidentified jet aircraft, require immediate assistance."

The Mirages were replaced by a flight of two Super Mystères codenamed Royal flight, armed with napalm bombs, led by Captain Yossi Zuk and his wingman, Yaakov Hamermish. Theu dropped napalm on the ship and strafed it. Most of the superstructure caught fire.

Zuk was readying a second attack when the Israeli Navy, alerted by the absence of return fire, warned Kislev the target could be Israeli. Kislev told the pilots not to attack if there was any doubt about identification; the Israeli Navy found none of its ships were under fire, and the aircraft were cleared to attack.

Kislev was still disturbed by a lack of return fire and requested one last attempt to identify the ship. While strafing the ship, Captain Zuk reported seeing no flag, but saw the ship's GTR-5 marking. Kislev immediately ordered the attack stopped.

The order to cease fire was given at 1420 hours, 24 minutes before the torpedo boats arrived at Liberty's position. Dring the interval, Liberty crewmen hoisted a large American flag. During this time, Liberty’s distress message was received by USS Saratoga. USS America dispatched eight aircraft. They were under orders from Task Group commander Admiral V.G. Lambert to strike IDF air bases. Sixth Fleet commander Vice-Admiral William I. Martin recalled the mission minutes later.

Some of the Israeli torpedo boats involved in the attack

When the torpedo boats arrived, Commander Oren saw Liberty could not be the destroyer that had shelled Arish or any ship capable of 30 knots. According to Michael Limor, an Israeli naval reservist, they attempted to contact the ship by heliograph and radio, but received no response. T-204 paused and signaled "AA" ("identify yourself"); McGonagle could only reply using a handheld Aldis lamp. Oren recalled receiving a similar response from the Ibrahim el Awal, an Egyptian destroyer captured by Israel during the Suez Crisis, and was convinced that he was facing an enemy ship. He concluded the ship was the Egyptian supply ship El Quseir. The captain of T-203 reached the same conclusion and the boats moved into battle formation.

Captain McGonagle ordered a sailor at machine gun Mount 51 to open fire. He then noticed the boats appeared to be flying Israeli flags, and "realized that there was a possibility of the aircraft having been Israeli and the attack had been conducted in error".McGonagle ordered Mount 51 to hold fire, but a short burst was fired at the torpedo boats before the gunner understood the order. Mount 53 began firing at the center torpedo boat at about the same time Mount 51 fired,; its fire was "extremely effective and blanketed the area and the center torpedo boat." Ensign Lucas was sent to tell Seaman Quintero, the gunner on Mount 53, to hold fire. Ensign Lucas reported he saw no one at mount 53. He believed the sound of gunfire was likely from ammunition cooking off, due to a nearby fire.

After coming under fire, the torpedo boats returned fire, killing Liberty's helmsman. They then launched five torpedoes. At 1435 hours, one torpedo hit Liberty on the starboard side forward of the superstructure, creating a 39 ft wide hole in what had been a cargo hold converted to the ship's electronic research spaces, killing 25 from the intelligence section, and wounding dozens. The torpedo hit a major hull frame that absorbed much of the energy; if the torpedo had missed the frame the Liberty would have split in two. The other four missed.

The torpedo boats then closed in and strafed the ship. According to Liberty crewmen, the torpedo boats fired at damage control parties and sailors preparing life rafts for launch. A life raftwas picked up by T-203, which found U.S. Navy markings. T-204 circled Liberty; Oren spotted the designation GTR-5, but saw no flag. It took until 1530 hours to establish the Liberty's identity. Shortly before, Saratoga launched eight aircraft. After the ship's identity was confirmed, the Israeli General Staff was notified and an apology was sent to U.S. naval attaché Commander Castle. The aircraft approaching Liberty were recalled to Saratoga.

USS Liberty after the attack

Soon afterward, the Israelis said they had mistakenly attacked the ship. The Johnson Administration conveyed "strong dismay" to Israeli ambassador Avraham Harman. Meanwhile, apologies were soon sent by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Foreign Minister Abba Eban, and chargé d'affaires Ephraim Evron. Within 48 hours, Israel offered to compensate the victims and their families.

From the start, the U.S. response to Israeli statements of mistaken identity ranged between frank disbelief to unquestioning acceptance within the administration in Washington. On June 10, Secretary Rusk stated:

“At the time of the attack, the USS Liberty was flying the American flag and its identification was clearly indicated in large white letters and numerals on its hull. ... Experience demonstrates that both the flag and the identification number of the vessel were readily visible from the air ... Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that the USS Liberty was identified, or at least her nationality determined, by Israeli aircraft approximately one hour before the attack. ... The subsequent attack by the torpedo boats, substantially after the vessel was or should have been identified by Israeli military forces, manifests the same reckless disregard for human life.”

In contrast to Secretary Rusk, President Johnson fully accepted the Israeli version of the “tragic incident." Johnson included only one small paragraph about the Liberty in his autobiography, in which he accepted the Israeli explanation, minimized the affair and distorted the number of dead and wounded, by lowering them from 34 to 10 and 171 to 100, respectively. Researcher Lenczowski stated, "It seems Johnson was more interested in avoiding a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union, ... than in restraining Israel."

McGonagle received the Medal of Honor for saving his ship.

On June 28, 1967, the Defense Department released the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry into the attack, which concluded:

“The Court produced evidence that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to identify LIBERTY correctly. The Court had insufficient information before it to make a judgment on the reasons for the decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to attack ... It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the culpability of the attackers, and no evidence was heard from the attacking nation.”

It has long been believed that the Israeli attack was intentional, to prevent the United States obtaining evidence that IDF soldiers in the Sinai were killing Egyptian soldiers after they had surrendered.

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