80 YEARS AGO TODAY - PART 2

With the failure of the strikes launched by the defenders at Midway, Admiral Nagumo was faced with a quandary. Would he order a second strike against the atoll, as recommended by the strike leader who reported significant damage but considered that a second strike would be necessary to knock out the defenses, or would he hold his aircraft in readiness for an attack against the American Navy? The fact that the submarines had reported no deployment from Hawaii gave cause for optimism among the staff that Operation MI was proceeding according to plan. Yet Nagumo was nagged by the worry that an enemy who had shown himself as determined as had the men who attacked the fleet regardless might yet have another surprise in store.

Of the 108 aircraft that had attacked Midway in Kido Butai’s first strike, 11 had been lost including three damaged aircraft that ditched during their return to the fleet; of those that returned, 14 were heavily damaged, and 29 were damaged in some degree. Nagumo was unaware of the losses suffered by VMF-221, and was further convinced that Midway was dangerous. The fleet’s first strike had not succeeded in neutralizing Midway, since American aircraft could still refuel and rearm to attack the Japanese fleet, while most of the land-based defenses were still intact. The leaders of the first strike agreed that a second attack was necessary if troops were to successfully land on June 7.

Following the attack by the Avengers and Marauders, at 0715 hours Nagumo ordered the torpedo bombers be rearmed with general-purpose bombs for another level bombing strike, and the dive bombers be loaded with high-explosive bombs. Down in the carrier hangar decks, the crews began the arduous task, which involved removing the ordnance already loaded, returning it to the ship’s magazine, then rearming with different ordnance.

The changeover had only just begun when the Tone No. 4 scout, whose launch had been delayed earlier, sent a message at 0728 hours that it had sighted an enemy naval force to the east, but gave no indication of the force’s composition. Nagumo and his staff were thunderstruck - how could this be? The admiral weighed his options, before giving the order at 0745 hours that Akagi and Kaga stop rearming and directed the force to prepare for an attack against ships. As the crews began reloading their charges, Nagumo ordered the scout to "ascertain ship types."

Before the scout could reply, Major Henderson’s Marine dive bombers were sighted over the fleet at approximately 0755 hours.

While the survivors of Henderson’s attack departed, having scored two minor hits on Akagi and Kaga, the Tone scout radioed at 0809 hours that the enemy force was five cruisers and five destroyers. As Nagumo was reading the message, eight B-17s from Midway appeared overhead and bombed Hiryū from 20,000 feet; once again, the ships evaded the high-altitude bombing. Within minutes of that attack, seven more B-17s that had been inbound to Midway from Hawaii when they had been diverted to attack the newly-discovered enemy fleet bombed from an altitude of 7-8,000 feet, with equally unsuccessful results. The B-17 crews returned to Midway, claiming hits on two carriers. As the Flying Fortresses turned away, Major Norris’ 11 Vindicators appeared out of the clouds and targeted the battleship Haruna, which they bombed ineffectively.

Nagumo was now badly rattled. If the American ships that the scout had spotted were operating without a carrier, they didn’t constitute a threat. Midway, on the other hand, was throwing punches that had so far missed, but what might result from the next one? Another strike was definitely required and the order was again passed to rearm. The crews in the hangars didn’t have time to take the armor-piercing ordnance below and stacked the bombs and torpedoes to the side as they began loading the bombers with the high-explosive bombs. Within moments of giving this order, Nagumo received a third message from the Tone No. 4 scout: “Enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier.”

Coral Sea had demonstrated that the lesson of pre-war carrier exercises was right: the side that landed the first blow would win. The sweating ordnance crews were once again ordered to change their loads. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier Division 2 with Hiryū and Sōryū, recommended an immediate strike with the forces at hand: 18 bombers each on Sōryū and Hiryū, and half the ready Combat Air Patrol about to be launched. The opportunity to launch an immediate strike was limited by the imminent return of the Midway strike force, which needed to land immediately or be forced to ditch at sea. Spotting the decks and launching aircraft would take at least 30 minutes and would mean that some of the planes launched to strike the enemy carriers would not be properly armed and might not have fighter escort. Nagumo had just seen what happened to unescorted American bombers. The admiral decided to wait and recover his planes, then launch a proper maximum-effort strike against the enemy.

Aboard the three American carriers cruising at “Point Luck,” the crews had been awakened at 0130 hours and fed between 0300-0400 hours to give them time to prepare. Surprisingly, Yorktown, the only carrier of the three whose leaders had direct combat experience, was held back in reserve while Enterprise and Hornet, which had yet to engage an enemy carrier, were assigned to make the maximum-effort strike. At approximately 0430 hours, Yorktown launched ten SBD-3s from Scouting Five to search north of the lleet for a distance of 100 miles. While Admiral Fletcher expected the Japanese to make their approach to Midway from the northwest, he wanted assurance his flank was secure. Point Luck was approximately 200 miles north-northeast of Midway; the admiral expected the enemy would not launch their strike from more than 300 miles north of the island, which would put them some 100 miles north of the American carriers.

A bit over an hour since the SBDs had departed, the electrifying news “Carriers sighted,” was received from the Catalina search plane at 0534 hours. At 0553 hours came the report, "Many planes heading Midway." Finally, at 0603 hours, the Cartalina reported "Two carriers and battleships bearing 320 degrees, distance 180, course 135, speed 25." Quick calculations placed the enemy fleet 175 miles west-southwest of the Americans. In fact the position report was incorrect; the enemy was now 200 miles away. Those extra miles would matter.

The pilots and crewmen of all three carriers manned their planes on the flight deck in preparation of immediate launch. On board Yorktown, John Bridgers remembered that “One repair made after we left Pearl was a large metal plate covering a hole in our ready room deck, through which a bomb had penetrated to the lower decks during the Coral Sea Battle.” Bridgers was disappointed that morning to find he was among the group of less-experienced pilots who would be held back from the initial strike, in case there was a need for a second strike. “I was on the traveling squad, but not yet on the first team.”

At 0607 hours, Admiral Fletcher ordered Spruance's two carriers to launch their attack. "Proceed southwesterly and attack enemy carriers as soon as definitely located." Spruance considered that while the reported range to the enemy was extreme, a strike could succeed. Chief of Staff Miles Browning determined that because the fleet would have to turn away from the enemy to launch the strike into the light southeasterly breeze that they should launch at approximately 0700 hours, giving them an hour to close the distance a further 25 miles, placing the enemy about 155 miles distant. Spruance agreed and Enterprise and Hornet began launching their air groups at 0656 hours. Where the Japanese had launched 108 aircraft form their four carriers in only seven minutes, Enterprise and Hornet required more than an hour to complete their launch of 117. Browning convinced Spruance that the need to attack the enemy at the earliest moment possible was greater than the need of making a coordinated attack, even if it meant that such lack of coordination would lessen the impact of the attacks.

While a student at the Naval War College ten years earlier, Browning had written a prescient paper in which he argued that the most vulnerable moment for an enemy carrier force was when they had recovered one strike and were attempting to launch a second. Knowing of the Japanese attack on Midway and assuming the enemy fleet was within 200 miles of the atoll, Browning determined that a strike as soon as possible had the best opportunity of catching the enemy in just this situation. At first, Spruance demurred and ordered the two air groups should form up before heading out to make their attack.

Aboard Enterprise, the flight deck was spotted first with eight Wildcat fighters to be launched for Combat Air Patrol. Behind them were 37 SBD bombers from Scouting and Bombing Six. Six of the VS-6 bombers carried a single 500-lb bomb, 13 were armed with one 500-lb and two 100-lb bombs. Bringing up the rear of the bomber strike force were the 18 Bombing Six SBDs, each armed with one 1000-pound armor-piercing bomb. The air group was led by LCDR C. Wade McCluskey, a fighter pilot by experience who had only recently assumed the position of CAG. This would be his first mission leading the dive bombers, and his inexperience in proper tactics would impact the battle.

The Enterprise Dauntlesses were airborne by 0725 hours forming up and climbing in circles above the carrier. Below, plane handlers struggled for long, gas-wasting minutes to strike below the four SBDs that had not been launched due to mechanical problems, in order to bring up Torpedo Six’s 18 planes. McClusky, who led the entire formation with VS-6, remembered “things seemed to come to a standstill." Twenty minutes after the dive bombers had launched, the first of the VF-6 Wildcat escorts was launched.. They were followed by the slow torpedo bombers. At 0745 hours, Spruance finally acceded to Browning’s argument and ordered McClusky and the dive bombers to “proceed on mission assigned.” By the time the torpedo bombers were airborne and assembled under the leadership of LCDR Gene Lindsey, the dive bombers were distant on the horizon. At this point, the escorting VF-6 Wildcats mistakenly took up position over Hornet’s Torpedo Eight, which left Torpedo Six without fighter escort.

Hornet’s air group also broke up shortly after Ring took up his westerly heading of 265 degrees at the head of the dive bombers. Torpedo Eight commander LCDR John Waldron, who believed his course information was correct, signaled his pilots to follow him and took up what he had determined was the most direct course to the enemy, taking a heading of 240 degrees.

Fortunately, Admiral Fletcher decided to commit Yorktown’s air group to launch at 0838 hours. The combat-experienced Air Department ordered the squadrons to execute a "running rendezvous". LCDR Lance Massey’s slow Torpedo Three TBDs were launched first and headed off at low altitude. Bombing Three and Scouting Five, led by VB-3's LCDR Max Leslie, launched next, while John Thach’s eight F4F-4 Wildcats launched last.

Unfortunately, the 36 Enterprise Dauntlesses flew a tight, pre-war “parade ground” formation. Despite the fact that all pilots had leaned their throttles as well as they could to maximize their range, the Japanese were a crucial 25 miles further away than they believed. The junior and less-experienced pilots had to jockey their throttles to maintain their position in the formation, using more fuel than the leaders; there would be losses due to fuel exhaustion regardless of any action over the Japanese fleet.

By around 0930 hours Midway time, the enemy fleet had not been spotted. Enterprise CAG McCluskey later recalled, “With the clear visibility it was certain that we hadn't passed them unsighted. Allowing for their maximum advance of 25 knots, I was positive they couldn't be in my left semi-circle, that is, between my position and the island of Midway. Then they must be in the right semi-circle, had changed course easterly or westerly, or, most likely reversed course. To allow for a possible westerly change of course, I decided to fly west for 35 miles, then to turn north-west in the precise reverse of the original Japanese course. After making this decision, my next concern was just how far could we go. We had climbed, heavily loaded, to a high altitude. I knew the planes following were probably using more gas than I was. So, with another quick calculation, I decided to stay on course 315 degrees until 1000 hours, then turn north-eastwardly before making a final decision to terminate the hunt and return to the Enterprise.” The formation droned west for another 25 minutes.

Dick Best flew at the head of Bombing Six, to the rear and below the 18 Scouting Six SBDs led by McCluskey. He remembered . "Mac flew right over what we had plotted as the likely Japanese course, and then flew on to the limits of range before we got lucky and spotted that destroyer and he made that right turn he should have made 25 minutes earlier. I knew we’d blown it, because I had it plotted and I was an excellent navigator. Unfortunately, we were maintaining radio silence and there was no way to catch up with Mac and convince him to turn when he should have, without burning too much fuel to make it to the target. Had we done that right, had we not flown wrong for 25 minutes and then spent 15 more minutes getting back to where we should have been, we wouldn’t have lost half our crews to fuel starvation when they were trying to get back to the ship afterwards, and we likely could have coordinated the attack with the torpedo bombers."

What had happened was Admiral Nagumo had received the first report clearly stating an American carrier was in the vicinity. Shortly after receiving that message, while he considered whether to strike the enemy immediately or land the planes from the Midway strike, the admiral had ordered a change of course to the northeast to close on the American carriers. While the three American strike forces headed for the Japanese fleet, the Japanese were planning a strike against Yorktown, the carrier that had been spotted and identified.

Torpedo Eight commander Waldron was beloved by his pilot as an inspirational leader who had done everything possible to take new pilots just out of flight school and give them the necessary training to have a chance at performing their mission. Just before takeoff, the squadron’s pilots had found the following message from their leader posted in their ready room: “My greatest hope is that we encounter a favorable tactical situation, but if we don’t, and the worst comes to the worst, I want each of us to do his utmost to destroy our enemies. If there is only one plane left to make a final run-in, I want that man to go in and get a hit. May God be with us all. Good luck, happy landings and give ’em hell.” An hour into their flight, Waldron had spotted a strange plane that had suddenly appeared to the squadron’s rear. The strange aircraft made no attempt to close on the Devastators. It was the Tone No. 4 scout, and it warned the fleet: “Fifteen enemy planes are heading toward you.”

Having taken the most direct course to the enemy, Waldron spotted Kido Butai shortly after his spread-out search formation had spotted smoke on the horizon at 0925 hours. His guess that the enemy would make a turn to the north had been right.

Unfortunately, his call to Stanhope Ring that he had found the fleet came too late. The Hornet CAG had taken the dive bombers and their escorting fighters out to their maximum range, and missed the Japanese fleet entirely, ending up somewhere to the north. Prewar carrier doctrine called for a strike force in this position to return to the nearest friendly land base. In this case, that meant a turn south to Midway, which was in no condition to received the strike force. Ring had required a “parade ground” formation, which meant increased gas usage; it was now questionable that the planes had the fuel to get to Midway. Some SBDs and F4Fs tried to return to Hornet, while the others headed toward Midway. While most of the dive bombers made it; only two of the 10 Wildcats returned. Ring’s decision effectively removed the Hornet from the battle equation and nearly cost Marc Mitscher his career, had he not already received notice of promotion to Rear Admiral.

While Torpedo Eight had been accidentally escorted by the fighters from Enterprise for part of their flight, when Waldron turned northwest, Lieutenant James Gray, the new CO of VF-6, continued to the west since he was not on the same frequency and had not heard Waldron’s change of course order. The Devastators were now completely alone. Waldron waggled his wings and pushed into a dive toward the ocean, followed by the others. They leveled off at 60 feet to take up their attack formation and headed alone toward the enemy carriers.

Approaching from the east, Waldron turned to attack the southernmost carrier of the four. The planes closed to a range of 16,000 yards from the enemy when 30 Zero fighters of the Combat Air Patrol swarmed the formation from behind and above. The first Devastator fell from the left side of the formation in flames. Ensign George Gay later reported he heard Waldron ask his gunner, Aviation Radioman 1/c Horace Dobbs, if the burning plane was a torpedo bomber or a fighter. The radioman in a distant PBY heard his indistinct words, “Watch those fighters! … My two wingmen are going into the water….”

The Zeros turned back from their initial assault and struck the formation again. Waldron was hit in his left wing, rupturing the fuel tank and setting the entire wing afire. He was last seen standing up in his cockpit as he tried to get out, just before the Devastator hit the water on fire, then disappeared into the depths.

Japanese gunners on the cruisers Tone and Chikuma opened up on the planes when they flew past, still aiming for the carriers. Both ships opened up with their main batteries, in hopes of creating water spouts the Devastators would fly into. By the time the bombers were past the two cruisers, there were only six left. Defensive fire from the fleet increased, putting up a veritable curtain of fire. One by one, five of the six planes were hit and sent crashing into the sea.

One flew on.

George Gay later remembered that just after the last of the five Devastators went down, he heard his gunner, Aviation Radioman 3/c Bob Huntington, call out over the intercom, “They got me sir.” He glanced back and saw his gunner slumped over his guns. Gay turned toward what he identified as the Kaga, though later research determined he was headed toward the wildly-evading Soryu, which was making a hard starboard turn. He maneuvered to come in on her port bow. A glance over his shoulder revealed a sky full of enemy fighters trying to close on him. Finally, 800 yards from the carrier, he pulled the handle and dropped his torpedo. The plane lifted from the loss of weight and he flew directly over the stern. Once past the targeted ship, he was hit by more fire and the first of five attacking Zeros flashed overhead. A 20mm shell flash-burned his left leg. A second Zero attacked and another shell fragment hit his left hand while a bullet hit his upper left arm. The stick went slack in his hand and the rudder pedals fell away. With its controls destroyed, the bomber pancaked out of control into the ocean a quarter mile behind the carrier Gay had attacked.

As the plane struck the water, the hood slammed shut over the cockpit. The plane began tipping for its final dive as Gay struggled to open the canopy. “I couldn’t hardly get it open. That’s when I got scared.” Finally the hood slid back and he scrambled out as it took its final dive. He was left bobbing in the sea; a moment later his seat cushion popped to the surface.

At 0930 hours, shortly after John Waldron turned toward the enemy, Torpedo Six's CO Gene Lindsey spotted the smokescreen laid by the defenders on the horizon to his north and turned to investigate. A moment later he identified three carriers and selected the closest, Kaga, for the attack. Japanese lookouts spotted the incoming torpedo bombers at 0938 hours, just as they were hit by the defending CAP. Kaga turned north to evade, forcing Lieutenant Arthur Ely’s seven-plane formation into a stern chase while Lindsey made a wide half-circle turn around the outside of the screening destroyers in an attempt to attack the ship’s port bow.

Ely radioed for Gray’s Wildcats as Zeros as the anti-aircraft fire concentrated on him, but the fighters were not there; Gray had arrived on the far side of the enemy fleet and waited for the call for assistance as they orbited 15 miles on the opposite side of the fleet from the torpedo bombers they were charged with protecting. The seven Devastators contiuned to chase Kaga as the CAP slashed at them, taking them down one-by-one. Finally only the TBDs flown by NAPs Aviation Machinist’s Mate 1/c A. Walter Winchell and Chief Aviation Machinist Stephen B. Smith were still in the air, both damaged. At a range of 1,000 yards, they both dropped their torpedoes and managed to escape the fire. Smith and his gunner made it back to Enterprise, while Winchell and gunner Aviation Radioman 3/c Douglas M. Cossit were forced to ditch when they ran out of fuel, surviving 17 days in their life raft until they were found and rescued by a Midway PBY on June 21.

Lindsey’s section was spared the attention of the CAP as they flew around the enemy formation, but were finally caught by the Zeros as they began their run in. Lindsey and three others were shot down, though Aviation Radioman 1/c William C. Humphrey managed to shoot down one Zero. The remaining three Devastators managed to drop their torpedoes and escape to return to Enterprise.

All of Torpedo Eight had been lost and only four of Torpedo Six returned. No hits were scored.

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