50 YEARS AGO TODAY - OPERATION FREQUENT WIND

Major Buang-Ly lands on USS Midway

April 1975 saw the wars in Southeast Asia come to an unexpected end - to the surprise of all parties involved.

The Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973 and touted in the United States as ending formal U.S. involvement , but did not end the fighting in South Vietnam. Almost immediately, both the North Vietnamese and their southern allies, and the South Vietnamese government, began violating the cease-fire as each side moved to gain control of as much territory as possible, since such occupation would provide the occupier with control of the regional population should there be further negotiations or a renewed war.

the North Vietnamese Politburo agreed in October 1974 that the war had reached its “final stage” and voted on the Resolution of 1975 that outlined the strategy to be followed in 1975 and 1976: in 1975, the army would consolidate gains, eliminate South Vietnamese border outposts, and continue the build-up in the south in preparation for the final general offensive in 1976.

The 1975 Spring Offensive, officially known as The General Offensive and Uprising of the Spring 1975, developed rapidly into a war-ending campaign following initial success in Phưoc Long Province.

Following the ARVN defeat at Buôn Mai Thuôt on March 10, the eretreat from the Central Highlands became a rout. The rapidity of the ARVN collapse surprised the North. By March 25, the Politburo decided it was no longer necessary to wait another year to begin the final offensive. Lê Duăn pressured the General Staff to take advantage of their gains in the highlands since there were only two months before the monsoon began. General Dũng was ordered to move the northern forces 370 miles south in order to capture Saigon by May 19, the late President Ho Chi Minh's birthday. In what was perhaps the most complex logistical feat of the war, the army managed to move into position by early April.

Those at the top of the U.S. intelligence community had little doubt the South Vietnamese government would fail to meet the challenge, regardless of any actions the U.S. might take to provide support. However, neither the CIA nor any other intelligence agency realized how fast this would happen. Evacuation of Southeast Asia was not discussed at the White House until April 6, when Secretary of State Kissinger informed President Ford that evacuation plans must be set up to deal with the emergency they now faced.

U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine personnel in the Defense Attache’s Office had commenced planning for a helicopter evacuation on April 1. Beginning in late March, the embassy had encouraged all dependents and non-essential staff to fly out to the Philippines and await further developments. On April 7, Nikki A. Fillipi, an Air America pilot, and Marine Lieutenant Robert Twigger of the DAO, set out to identify possible landing zones in Saigon for the coming evacuation. Over the next few days, they surveyed 37 buildings and selected 13 as Landing Zones. Workers from Pacific Architects and Engineers then removed obstructions from the sites and painted an “H” that was the exact “footprint” for the skids of a Huey helicopter on each. All the work had to be accomplished in accordance with Ambassador Martin’s order that he would not tolerate any outward sign that the Americans intended to abandon South Vietnam.

Beginning on April 12, Task Force 76 gathered off the coast. Brigadier General Richard E. Carey, commander of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade tasked with organizing support of the evacuation. Planning by the Marines was made more difficult by Ambassador Martin’s strict adherence to the terms of the Paris Peace Accords, which limited total American military personnel in the country to no more than 50; for each specialist brought in, someone else had to first leave.

In Subic Bay on April 16, the veteran carrier Midway was ordered to put her air group ashore and depart to join Task Force 76. The carrier had several Air Force helicopters aboard, but her primary role would be as an empty deck to serve as an emergency landing field for evacuees. Off Vietnam, Midway was joined by Hancock, still carrying HMM-453's helicopters. Coral Sea, enroute to Sydney, Australia, to celebrate the Battle of the Coral Sea, was ordered to turn around and head for Vietnam. Enterprise, which was conducting flight operations off the northern Philippines, was directed to provide air support for the coming evacuation .

In Hanoi, a group of pilots who had flown MiG-17s until the fighter was removed from frontline service in 1972 were organized to move south and operate captured VNAF aircraft in order to provide battlefield air support for the army. Among the pilots was now-Senior Lieutenant Tu De. The others were Nguyen Văn Loc, Hán Văn Quang, Hoàng Mai Vư ng and Tran Cao Thăng. They flew to the captured airfield at DaNang; Tu De later recalled that there were “many” Cessna A-37B light attack aircraft and Northrop F-5As that had been abandoned on the airfield. “With the assistance of several technicians of the other air force, we identified several A-37s that could be repaired the easiest, and took the necessary parts from the others.” Two surrendered VNAF A-37 pilots explained the flight manuals to the North Vietnamese pilots while the aircraft were made operational. The first repaired A-37 was declared airworthy on April 25. The others s were declared operational over the next two days. By the end of the day on April 27, each of the former MiG-17 pilots had made three solo flights in the. That night, the five aircraft were fully fueled with an extra drop tank under each win; each carried four Mk.82 500-pound bombs.

April 27 saw Saigon come under fire from PAVN 122mm rockets for the first time since 1973. The evacuation coordinators from 7th Air Force limited incoming flights at Tan Son Nhut to C-130s because of their greater maneuverability during landing and takeoff, which would make them less vulnerable to the shoulder-fired SA-7 “Strella” AAMs used by the advancing PAVN forces. Over the preceding eight days, nearly 40,000 American and South Vietnamese refugees had been evacuated from Tan Son Nhut.

On April 28, the five A-37sflew at low level to Thành Sơn airfield, where they refueled. They departed Thành Sơn at 1700 hours, headed for Tan Son Nhut airfield at low level to avoid radar detection. At 1805 hours, controllers in the Tan Son Nhut tower reported five VNAF A-37s inbound. Moments later, those on the field realized the A-37s were not landing when they strafed aircraft on the ground. The Mk 82s tumbled from their wings and exploded on the field. Six exploded close enough to severely damage several C-130s and two were set on fire. At the time, it was though the pilots of the A-37s were VNAF pilots who had defected, since no one thought North Vietnamese pilots could have made the transition to the American aircraft in the short time since airfields in South Vietnam had been abandoned. This mistaken view of the VNAF has been part of the “official history” ever since. Once he had dropped his bombs, Tu De pulled out of his strafing run and spotted a C-130 ahead that had just taken off and was turning toward the gulf. He flew past the big transport and from a distance of 75-100 feet waggled his wings at the pilots in the cockpit and later recalled thinking to himself, “I wish you a safe flight to America.” He then banked away and made a pass over Saigon at an altitude of 300 feet, drawing fire from the Presidential Palace. The other four pilots each took a separate course as they turned away from their attack, in order to break up any pursuers. Three VNAF F-5s did attempt to give chase but lost the A-37s in the smoke and haze surrounding Saigon. The five VPAF pilots returned safely to DaNang by 1950 hours.

Following the VPAF attack, PAVN forces fired rockets and artillery at the airfield after dark. At 0330 hours on April 29, a 122mm rocket hit Guardpost One at the DAO Compound. Two members of the Embassy Marine Security Guard Battalion, Corporal Charles McMahon and Lance Corporal Darwin Lee Judge, were killed instantly in the explosion. McMahon, who was 11 days short of his 22nd birthday, had arrived in South Vietnam ten days earlier while Judge, who was two and a half months past his 19th birthday, had been in-country since early March. They were the last two American combat deaths in the Vietnam War. When the war began, they had been pre-schoolers.

As dawn, VNAF aircraft began taking off in disorganized formations headed for Thailand while pilots and crews of Hueys loaded family members and took off, flying out to sea in search of the ships of Task Force 76. At 0800 hours Lt General Tran Văn Minh, the VNAF commandeer, accompanied by 30 staff members, arrived at the DAO compound and demanded evacuation. The VNAF was no longer an organized force. At 0700 hours, General Smith advised Ambassador Martin that further evacuation from Tan Son Nhut was impossible and that Operation Frequent Wind should commence. Martin insisted on visiting Tan Son Nhut to see things for himself. He arrived at 0930 hours to find the airfield afire and abandoned.

In Washington, President Ford learned of the loss of the events in the midst of a meeting with his energy and economic advisers. He scribbled a note to NSC Deputy Director Lt. General Brent Scowcroft that it was time to decide how to end things in Vietnam. It was determined that evacuation by commercial flights, military airplanes or by sea was no longer feasible. Two hours later, Ambassador Martin called to inform the president that Tan Son Nhut was no longer operational. With that, everyone agreed they had to go with “Option Four” - the helicopter evacuation. At 1108 hours South Vietnam time April 29, Commander Task Force 76 received the CINCPAC order to execute Operation Frequent Wind.

Shortly before 1400 hours, Lt. Colonel Herbert Fix, CO of HMM-463, received orders to commence the evacuation. Marine air crews and infantrymen manned their CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters. Moments later, the CH-53s lifted off the deck and took up a tight formation as they flew through the dark, ominous rain clouds that hovered over the South China Sea, bouncing in the blustery wind; 40 minutes later, they flew over the city and saw Tan Son Nhut in the distance. Soon Fix spotted the LZ in the tennis court near the DAO compound. Landing two at a time, the helicopters unloaded Fox Company and reinforced Hotel Company at 1506 hours; they moved to reinforce the 125 Marines of the Embassy Security Battalion. The second wave of 12 CH-53s landed at 1515 hours. A third wave of two CH-53s from HMH-463 and eight CH-53Cs and two HH-53s of the Air Force’s 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron operating from Midway arrived shortly afterwards. The helicopters quickly picked up waiting evacuees as more Air America Hueys fluttered in with others.

Air America had committed 24 of 28 available helicopters, and 31 pilots had agreed to remain in Saigon for the evacuation. At 0830 hours the Air America helicopters started flying to the designated rooftop Landing Zones in Saigon to pick up evacuees and fly them out to the ships offshore. The pilots found the traffic around Midway and Hancock impossible, with desperate VNAF helicopters flying out to the fleet; they were only able to make more than one trip by touching down on the amphibious ships to discharge their passengers. Time magazine correspondent William Stewart recalled his flight: “I sat in cold panic as the chopper took off. For the next three minutes as we gained altitude, we held our breaths. We knew the communists had been using heat-seeking missiles, and we were prepared to be shot out of the sky. As I turned around to see who was aboard, Buu Vien, the South Vietnamese Interior Minister, smiled and gave a thumbs-up signal. Forty minutes later we were aboard the USS Denver, safe.”

Coral Sea and Enterprise launched fighters to provide possible air cover over the city. RIO Lt(jg) Teddy Prendergast flew with Lt. Commander Kenneth “Frog” Burgess and later recalled: “We flew over Saigon at about ten thousand feet. Looking down, it was just insane, all the crowds in the street, helicopters taking off from building roofs and flying every which way. I was amazed there weren’t any midairs.”

Another drama unfolded that day on Con Son Island. VNAF Major Buang-Ly was determined he would find a way to get his wife and five children out the country.Finding an abandoned Cessna O-1 “Bird Dog” abandoned on the island’s airfield, he and his wife stuffed their children, who ranged in age from 14 months to six years, into the airplane and he managed to take off as communist forces arrived on the field and opened fire at the airplane. He had no idea where to go, and headed out to sea. An hour later, he spotted ship’s wakes in the sea, then found the carriers and their escorts. Commander Vern Jumper, Air Boss of Midway, later remembered what happened: "Suddenly, out of nowhere, this little Bird Dog appeared overhead and circled the ship. He made three passes right over the flight deck at about 100 feet, trying each time to drop a note. The first two blew over the side, but the third one stayed on deck. It said ‘I can land on your runway, would you please move the helicopters to the other side of your runway. I have one more hour of fuel. Would you please rescue me?’ It was signed it Major Buang, wife and five children.” Jumper went to the bridge to confer with Captain Chambers. “At first I suggested we have him ditch alongside the ship, put swimmers in the water, and save him. But Captain Chambers said , ‘We’re not going to do that. If he ditches in the water, he’ll lose those five kids.'”

Chambers ordered Jumper to clear the angle deck by pushing the helicopters over the side. He later recalled “There were about ten million dollars worth of helicopters there and I thought to myself I was probably ending my career, but I did it anyway.” As the deck crew pushed the helicopters overboard, two others landed in the midst of the activity. Their crews and passengers were pulled out and they were put over the side with the rest. Finally, the deck was clear.

Jumper remembered, “We turned into the wind. This guy made a couple passes at the ship just to look. I had no radio communications with him. I couldn’t talk to him. He could see that we were ready for him. We had 30-40 knots right down the angle deck, and he started his final approach. He made a beautiful carrier landing without a tail hook. He touched down right where he should have, bounced once, rolled up the deck and was stopped before he got to the end of the angle deck. My flight deck crew ran out to grab him before he went over the side. The major and his wife jumped out of the cockpit, pulled the seat forward, and out tumbled the kids. She was holding a baby in her arms. My flight deck crew and all the other guys that were working on the flight deck in the squadrons and the ship’s company were whooping and hollering and making so much noise. They were so proud, so glad that they saved this guy.”

While some of Captain Chambers’ superiors might have initially been upset about the loss of the helicopters, film of the landing was broadcast across the United States the next day. Major Buang-ly’s stunning escape made headlines from coast to coast with the photo of the O-1 on Midway’s deck was on every front page. Captain Chambers and his crew were heroes. (The airplane can be seen today aboard Midway, now a museum in San Diego.)

The most memorable moments of the evacuation occurred at the American Embassy in Saigon. Some 10,000 people were gathering around the embassy in hopes of finding a way out, while around 2,500 evacuees were in the embassy and consular compounds awaiting transport for evacuation. The crowds outside blocked traffic; the gates had been closed to prevent them from surging onto the embassy grounds. Those who were eligible for evacuation who had not gotten to the embassy in time had to find their way through the crowd and make themselves known to the embassy staff or Marine guards manning the walls. They then had to be lifted over the walls while those below tried to use them as a way to get into the compound. One who managed to get out later recalled that “You could smell the desperation and fear in the air.”

Inside the embassy, the crisis was worse. Some staff and evacuees had taken alcohol from the Embassy's stores and were now wandering around in varying states of inebriation. Others were busy removing intelligence documents and U.S. currency from safes and taking it to the incinerator. No one knew how much of the money actually made it from the safes to the incinerator in the confusion, but one staffer later estimated that more than five million dollars were burned. Those who were eligible for evacuation who had not gotten to the embassy in time had to find their way through the crowd and make themselves known to the embassy staff or Marine guards manning the walls. They then had to be lifted over the walls while those below tried to use them as a way to get into the compound. One who managed to get out later recalled that “You could smell the desperation and fear in the air.”

Ambassador Martin, who had caused problems throughout with his unwillingness to accept reality, finally gave permission to cut down the trees surrounding the embassy parking lot so helicopters could land. This created additional problems, since those offshore had assumed all evacuees had been taken to the DAO Compound; only two helicopters were scheduled to evacuate Ambassador Martin and the Marines from the embassy. A CH-46 arrived at 1700 hours, bringing the first of 130 Marines from 2/4 BLT from the DAO compound to reinforce perimeter security. The helicopter departed filled with evacuees. The last evacuees departed the DAO compound at 1900 hours and Major James Kean, who commanded the Marine Security Guard Battalion was told operations at the embassy would cease at sunset. He pointed out that the LZ would be well lit and requested operations continue, positioning vehicles around the parking lot to light it. Informed by a CH-53 pilot who landed at 2130 hours that Task Force 76 commander Admiral Whitmire had ordered operations to cease at 2300, Kean went to Ambassador Martin and asked him to contact the White House and ensure the airlift continued. Martin did so, and Task Force 76 received orders that flights were to continue. Despite pilot fatigue and the poor visibility due to bad weather, darkness and smoke, General Carey managed to convince the admiral they should maintain the effort.

With helicopters landing at the embassy every 10 minutes, Kean informed General Carey at 0215 hours that there were 225 Americans and 850 non-Americans left and that another 19 lifts would complete the evacuation. At 0300 hours, Ambassador Martin ordered Kean to move the remaining evacuees to the parking lot, which became the final perimeter. Word was received at 0327 hours that President Ford had ordered the evacuation ended when the 19 additional flights had been made. That number was already exceeded; Kean went to the rooftop LZ at 0430 hours and used a helicopter radio to contact Carey, who told him the president had ordered the airlift limited to Americans only. At 0458 hours, Ambassador Martin finally boarded an HMM-165 CH-46, call-sign “Lady Ace 09" for evacuation to the task force command ship, USS Blue Ridge.

Kean returned to the ground floor and ordered his men to withdraw into the chancery. The last were stepping inside as the crowd surrounding the embassy broke open the gates and surged into the compound. They bolted the chancery door while Seabees on the sixth floor locked the elevators; the Marines withdrew up the stairs, locking grill gates behind them.

The men gathered on the roof, searching the night sky for the helicopters coming for them. Below on the ground floor, someone drove a water tanker through the chancery door and the crowd surged into the building, battering their way through the grill gates in a desperate final attempt to get to the roof. Kean managed to establish radio contact with the fleet, to learn that when Lady Ace 09's pilot transmitted "Tiger is out", the inbound helicopter crews thought the mission was complete and turned back.

The Marines managed to seal the doors to the rooftop and used Mace to force the crowd back. Sporadic gunfire passed overhead. Twenty minutes later, CH-46s arrived and evacuated most of the Marines and Seabees. Kean and 10 Marines were left on the roof. After an anxious wait, CH-46 “Swift 22" of HMM-164 arrived overhead at 0700 hours on May 1, 1975. With the last Americans aboard, Swift 22 lifted off the embassy rooftop at 0753 hours and landed on USS Hancock at 0830 hours.

By the time aircraft ceased operation from Tan Son Nhut on April 28, 50,493 people - including 2,678 Vietnamese orphans - had been evacuated . Following the activation of Operation Frequent Wind, 122 Marine pilots logged 1,054 flying hours in 682 sorties, airlifting 395 Americans and 4,475 Vietnamese and third-country nationals from the DAO compound and 978 American and 1,120 Vietnamese and third-country nationals from the embassy.

America’s wars in Southeast Asia were finally over.

(Adaptedfrom “The Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club: Naval Aviation in the Vietnam War”)

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